The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower
Stephen E. Ambrose
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
In this classic portrait of Dwight D. Eisenhower the soldier, bestselling historian Stephen E. Ambrose examines the Allied commander’s leadership during World War II.
Ambrose brings Eisenhower’s experience of the Second World War to life, showing in vivid detail how the general’s skill as a diplomat and a military strategist contributed to Allied successes in North Africa and in Europe, and established him as one of the greatest military leaders in the world. Ambrose, then the Associate Editor of the General’s official papers, analyzes Eisenhower’s difficult military decisions and his often complicated relationships with powerful personalities like Churchill, de Gaulle, Roosevelt, and Patton. This is the definitive account of Eisenhower’s evolution as a military leader—from its dramatic beginnings through his time at the top post of Allied command.
particularly in a large, comfortable city like Algiers. The staff did not get its required work done when the officers had comfortable billets and social obligations, and the troops resented it when they saw staff officers living in splendor. Eisenhower told Smith to set up an advanced headquarters at Naples and to be prepared to move the AFHQ headquarters there when it was captured. It took more than a month to arrange the move, and when it did come it accomplished none of Eisenhower’s purposes.
locality where he can support himself and his family, and to be sure of fair treatment when he might be accused of any crime—all these would disappear if the forces opposed to us should, through carelessness or overconfidence on our part, succeed in winning this war.” The Allied cause was “completely bound up with the rights and welfare of the common man.”4 Eisenhower’s patriotism was simple and direct. As in his approach to many other things, it had few nuances or qualifications. In October his
postpone ANVIL, not cancel it altogether. After OVERLORD was successful he would send LSTs back to the Mediterranean for a midsummer invasion of the south of France. Wilson, on the other hand, recommended stepping up operations in Italy itself, with end runs like Anzio whenever possible. This meant continuing operations in Italy after Rome fell, which could only be done at the expense of an ANVIL mounted later in the summer. The British felt the best strategy was to maintain a strong campaign in
Canadians at Antwerp got what was left of men and supplies, which was very little. One difficulty was that Eisenhower continued to think both ends could be achieved and urged Montgomery to get as far east as possible; he never took a firm stand with Montgomery regarding Antwerp. The enemy, desperately afraid of being outflanked at Arnhem, reinforced themselves on Montgomery’s front. Eisenhower, recognizing that this development meant that Twenty-first Army Group needed help, told Bradley to take
attended a number of Marshall’s conferences, “I have never seen him so concerned as he was on this occasion.” Marshall told the press they were incredibly stupid if they did not see what the outcome of their expression of shock and amazement at the deal would be. Press criticism would play into the hands of the British, who would demand Eisenhower’s replacement by a Britisher, and American leadership of an Allied expedition would have such a black eye that there would be great difficulty in