The Question of Psychological Types: The Correspondence of C. G. Jung and Hans Schmid-Guisan, 1915-1916 (Philemon Foundation Series)
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
In 1915, C. G. Jung and his psychiatrist colleague, Hans Schmid-Guisan, began a correspondence through which they hoped to codify fundamental individual differences of attention and consciousness. Their ambitious dialogue, focused on the opposition of extraversion and introversion, demonstrated the difficulty of reaching a shared awareness of differences even as it introduced concepts that would eventually enable Jung to create his landmark 1921 statement of the theory of psychological types. That theory, the basis of the widely used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and similar personality assessment tools, continues to inform not only personality psychology but also such diverse fields as marriage and career counseling and human resource management.
This correspondence reveals Jung fielding keen theoretical challenges from one of his most sensitive and perceptive colleagues, and provides a useful historical grounding for all those who work with, or are interested in, Jungian psychology and psychological typology.
in another text of 1916: “The introversion type knows only the thinking principle, the extraversion type only the feeling principle” (1916a, § 482). 34 Cf. also the frequent references to the constant misunderstandings between the two types, and the tendency to devalue the other—no doubt also on the basis of his own experiences, not least in his relationship with Schmid— which run like a red thread through his descriptions in Psychological Types (chap. X). Introduction • 29 thinking
the savior is infantile humbug and has to be nailed down as such. In my opinion, you have touched upon something very important with your idea that an association of like types is more conducive to a deepening of one’s own personality than an association of different types. Just as I am absolutely con165 Struck out: He does not worry about that. 7 J (4 September 1915) • 109 vinced that it is mandatory for adaptation to reality that the two opposed types confront each other unreservedly, I
am referring to the dynamic aspect of the process with this, but I clearly emphasized in my last letter that we have different views about the way that leads to the purification of feeling. Insofar as this end result is not something that has to be achieved only once, having finally come to the end of the way, but must be achieved again and again, it seems to me that precisely the dynamic aspect—the progress in the development of the feelings, and the way toward it—is of the greatest importance.
not as ideally oriented ones. The extravert, too, does not imagine that he deepens the personality of the introvert by defending his standpoint of feeling. In assuming that the extravert wants, in his relation to the introvert, to “indoctrinate” and “better” the latter, you impute an intention to him, which he does not have even in the archaic, infantile state. The extravert does what he does not in order to achieve anything; he acts because he must act. Above all, he does not want to produce a
any one side—for “reality” can be expanded interminably—we need some sort of standard, and this standard can be provided only by the subject, never by the object. Although the object can constrain us outwardly, it cannot do the thinking process, which sets norms and limits, for us. The moral law lies within ourselves, not in the object. I have to protect the object against too much experimenting. Even the Freudian way of analysis aims at a change in the subjective attitude, which is brought about