The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford Handbooks of Political Science)
Barry R. Weingast, Donald A. Wittman
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Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions.
This Handbook surveys the field of political economy, with fifty-eight chapters ranging from micro to macro, national to international, institutional to behavioral, methodological to substantive. Chapters on social choice, constitutional theory, and public economics are set alongside ones on voters, parties and pressure groups, macroeconomics and politics, capitalism and democracy, and international political economy and international conflict.
concave in x r F i (−ui (x)) is convex in x. If (x ∗A , x B∗ ) is an interior equilibrium, then both candidates locate at the utilitarian point: x ∗A = x B∗ = x. ⁹ This overturns Theorem 2 of Hinich 1978. See Banks and Duggan 2005 for an extended discussion. 76 candidate objectives and electoral equilibrium p2 1 Probability of winning level set Profitable deviations for probability of winning 1 2 Expected vote level set p1 1 2 1 Fig. 4.4 Diﬃculty with win motivation Of the assumptions
one. While this result is remarkable, it hinges crucially on unconventional assumptions about the labor market. While electoral competition is often modeled in terms of two candidates competing in a majoritarian system, elections frequently involve non-majoritarian electoral rules, and multiple candidates. Meyerson (1993) shows that electoral rules have a profound impact on the sorts of oﬀers candidates will make. He develops a common framework for comparing various electoral configurations.
magnitude, the lower the threshold of exclusion (or of representation), and thus the easier it is for parties to achieve representation with only relatively limited electoral support. Thus, for any electoral rule (with the exception of plurality bloc voting), expectations of possible electoral success should increase with district magnitude, and thus more parties should be expected to compete at the district level. However, if there are numerous small parties or independent candidacies (some of
ballot access. Many non-democratic nations have stringent legal restrictions on competition, or in practice make it impossible for other parties to compete successfully with the ruling party. But even in some democratic nations with genuine political competition, such as the USA we can find a fairly drastic form of cartelized politics, in which existing major parties seek to restrict the domain of competition to bar further entrants by raising substantial legal barriers to new parties (or
institutions are treated as being endogenous. If the history of research on endogenous legislative institutions is any guide, there will be disagreement on which institutions are endogenous to other institutions. These controversies, in turn, help shape our understanding of institutions and provide a deeper understanding of organizations. 2 Revelation and Aggregation of Information: Voting ............................................................................. In this section, we consider