The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics (Oxford Handbooks)
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The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics provides an accessible and authoritative guide to health economics, intended for scholars and students in the field, as well as those in adjacent disciplines including health policy and clinical medicine. The chapters stress the direct impact of health economics reasoning on policy and practice, offering readers an introduction to the potential reach of the discipline.
Contributions come from internationally-recognized leaders in health economics and reflect the worldwide reach of the discipline. Authoritative, but non-technical, the chapters place great emphasis on the connections between theory and policy-making, and develop the contributions of health economics to problems arising in a variety of institutional contexts, from primary care to the operations of health insurers. The volume addresses policy concerns relevant to health systems in both developed and developing countries. It takes a broad perspective, with relevance to systems with single or multi-payer health insurance arrangements, and to those relying predominantly on user charges; contributions are also included that focus both on medical care and on non-medical factors that affect health. Each chapter provides a succinct summary of the current state of economic thinking in a given area, as well as the author's unique perspective on issues that remain open to debate. The volume presents a view of health economics as a vibrant and continually advancing field, highlighting ongoing challenges and pointing to new directions for further progress.
overall premium elasticity of consumers for increasing their monopolistic markup. 13.5.3 International Purchasing Vertically integrated private health insurers may act as 舠wholesale舡 purchasers of healthcare services on behalf of their clients, who then choose a particular provider in the event of illness. Traditionally, public social insurers were legally bound to purchase domestically, with exceptions within the European Union (Hermans and Berman 1998; Hatzopoulos 2008). This limits the
applicants, most likely the sponsor cannot calculate risk-adjusted subsidies either. To solve this problem the sponsor can provide the insurers with a subsidy for high-risk subscribers in the form of excess-loss compensations (or outlier payments). For example, the insurers can be fully or partly compensated by the subsidy fund for an individual舗s expenses in excess of a certain annual threshold. (Excess-loss compensations can be considered as a form of mandatory reinsurance with community-rated
regulatory rules and the nature of competition. In the US pharmacy-driven generic market, originator strategies to produce their own generics have been unsuccessful (other than authorized generics during the exclusivity period) because originator firms lack the major generic firms舗 large portfolio of products and low costs, which are essential for competing for pharmacy customers.11 Other originator strategies include: shifting patients to a follow-on formulation (usually a delayed release
multidimensional and net effects on competition, information and appropriate usage may differ, depending on the circumstances. Berndt et al. (1995) find that promotional stocks of detailing, journal advertising, and DTCA (pre-1997) significantly affect industry-level demand for antiulcerants, but with diminishing returns, again suggesting the importance of reminder or loyalty-building promotion. Promotion studies post-1997. The growth of DTCA has shifted the focus and the complexity of empirical
reduced form approach that avoids the use of structural estimation and specific functional forms. They show that, if the impact of the policy reform can be captured wholly through changes in the budget constraint, a fully non-parametric approach can be used and they derive a matching estimator to identify the treatment effects. This places ex ante evaluation within the potential outcomes framework and constructs counterfactuals by matching untreated individuals with other untreated individuals.