The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity (History of Philosophy Series)
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the specific logical function that a judgment may express. A judgment may, for example, attribute a predicate to a subject (rather than connect a ground and its consequent) and be a “categorical” judgment. The example Kant gives (on B 128) is “all bodies are divisible,” in which divisibility is 9. See H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 117. 20 Chapter One predicated of the subject, “all bodies.” Now, we can
orthodox reading of Hegel. This is because it does not describe what happens at the start of philosophy but explains what is entailed by philosophy’s being a circle. Insofar as philosophy is circular, Hegel says, its beginning points forward to, and so presupposes, its end (indeed, as we learn from a similar passage at the end of the Phenomenology and as we saw in the last chapter, its end points back to, and so presupposes, its beginning [see PhS 488/585]). The important thing to remember,
aware—as we should be—that the thought of pure being is produced by, and is thus the mediated result of, a process of abstraction undertaken in ordinary language.38 At the outset of the Logic, however, when we are to suspend all our assumptions and convictions about thought and being, we have to set aside this idea that being is a mediated abstraction and take it in its immediacy as pure being alone: Pure being, this absolute immediacy[,] has equally the character of something absolutely
could have arisen (was bound to arise).”6 One of his many (and often contradictory) answers to this question is that man “derived the concept ‘being’ only from the concept ‘ego,’ he posited ‘things’ as possessing being according to his own image.”7 Nietzsche does not have in mind Hegel’s concept of being in particular, nor does he understand the concept in the same way as Hegel (he associates being with stasis, rigidity, and 2. Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 139–40. 3.
therefore, being asked to embark on the presuppositionless study of pure being is like being invited “to walk on [one’s] head.” Consciousness regards the demand made of it by speculative philosophy as a “violence (Gewalt) it is expected to do to itself, all unprepared and seemingly without necessity.” Ordinary consciousness, Hegel writes, is characterized not by the commitment to radical self-criticism but by “the certainty of itself”; from its point of view, speculative philosophy simply looks