Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War
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Oil is the world's single most important commodity and its political effects are pervasive. Jeff Colgan extends the idea of the resource curse into the realm of international relations, exploring how countries form their foreign policy preferences and intentions. Why are some but not all oil-exporting 'petrostates' aggressive? To answer this question, a theory of aggressive foreign policy preferences is developed and then tested, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Petro-Aggression shows that oil creates incentives that increase a petrostate's aggression, but also incentives for the opposite. The net effect depends critically on its domestic politics, especially the preferences of its leader. Revolutionary leaders are especially significant. Using case studies including Iraq, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, this book offers new insight into why oil politics has a central role in global peace and conflict.
best article published by an untenured scholar. Dr Colgan has previously worked with the World Bank, McKinsey & Company, and The Brattle Group. Petro-Aggression When Oil Causes War Je f f D . Co lg an C AMB RIDGE UNIVE RS IT Y P RE S S Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
is restricted to politically-relevant dyads: that is, only dyads in which the states are geographically contiguous or at least one of the states is a major power. The use of directed dyads allows the analysis to capture which state is the aggressor or revisionist party in the conflict. Table 4.4 provides the results of the analysis, which are quite consistent with those from the monadic analysis. The table shows three models, each with a different dependent variable: Model A focuses on MIDs in
propensity for international conflict, principally by reducing the leader’s risk of domestic punishment for foreign policy adventurism. Oil income could also be used to increase the state’s military capabilities. There is evidence that both of these effects were present in Iraq. Saddam used the country’s oil income to create a system of patronage and fear that permeated Iraqi society and weakened political 120 Petro-Aggression accountability. Oil income financed the patronage networks that
been seething with conspiracies, as various groups of officers and politicians prepared to topple the ailing regime of King Idris. A group of radical young officers led by the charismatic Muammar al-Qaddafi, beat all the others to the punch, including their military superiors, who had scheduled their own coup for just three or D. Vandewalle, 2006: 58–63. L. Anderson, 1986; D. Vandewalle, 1998. 6 D. Vandewalle, 2006. 7 E. Clouston, 1992. 4 5 Libya and the Arab Jamahiriyya 129 four days
E. Weinthal, 2010; K. Morrison, 2009; M. Ross, 2012; J. Sachs and A. Warner, 1995; P. Stevens and E. Dietsche, 2008. 29 According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, global oil production was worth approximately $2.3 trillion in 2010. The OECD’s website reports that total Official Development Assistance in 2010 was $120 billion. While OECD aid is not the same as the global total, it is the probably the largest part. 30 M. Humphreys, 2005; M. Ross, 2012. 28 Introduction 13 larger