Nicomachean Ethics (Hackett Classics)
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An excellent new translation and commentary. It will serve newcomers as an informative, accessible introduction to the Nicomachean Ethics and to many issues in Aristotle’s philosophy, but also has much to offer advanced scholars. The commentary is noteworthy for its frequent citations of relevant passages from other works in Aristotle’s corpus, which often shed new light on the texts. Reeve’s translation is meticulous: it hits the virtuous mean--accurate and technical, yet readable--between translation’s vicious extremes of faithlessness and indigestibility.--Jessica Moss, New York University
involuntary? Or is that certainly ridiculous, since they have a single cause? But presumably it is strange to call the things we should desire “involuntary.” And we should be angry |30| at certain things and have an appetite for certain ones, such as health and learning. It also seems that involuntary things are painful, whereas those in accord with appetite are pleasant. Further, what difference in involuntariness is there between errors made on the basis of rational calculation and those made
someone were to say that everyone seeks the apparent good but that we do not control its appearance. Instead, whatever sort of person each of us happens to be also determines the sort of end that appears to him. |1114b1| Well, if each individual is somehow responsible for his own state of character, he is also somehow responsible for the appearance in question. If not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing but does evil things because of ignorance of the end, thinking that because of doing
being a beneficiary. But he will get from the sources he should (for example, from his own possessions), regarding this not as noble but as necessary, |1120b1| in order to have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own possessions, since of course he wishes to assist others by means of them. Nor will he give to random people—in order that he be able to give to the ones he should when he should and where it is noble to do so. What is exceedingly characteristic of a generous person is even to
|30| But if to do what is unconditionally an unjust action is to harm someone voluntarily; and if “voluntarily” means for someone to know the one affected, the instrument, and the way; and if a person who lacks self-control harms himself voluntarily; then he would voluntarily suffer an unjust action and it would be possible for someone to do an unjust action to himself. This is also one of the puzzles that are raised, namely, whether it is possible for someone to do an unjust action to himself.
cannot be any of the three of these (by the three I mean practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, and theoretical wisdom), the remaining alternative is for understanding to be of starting-points. VI 7 Wisdom in crafts we ascribe to the most exact practitioners of the relevant craft (for example, calling Phidias a wise sculptor in stone and |10| Polyclitus a wise sculptor in bronze), here signifying nothing else by wisdom, indeed, than that it is the virtue of a craft.438 There are, however, some