Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of Negation and Difference (Suny Series, Intersections: Philosophy and Critical Theory)
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A critical account of the key connections between twentieth-century French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and nineteenth-century German idealist G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation provides a critical account of the key connections between twentieth-century French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and nineteenth-century German idealist G. W. F. Hegel. While Hegel has been recognized as one of the key targets of Deleuze’s philosophical writing, Henry Somers-Hall shows how Deleuze’s antipathy to Hegel has its roots in a problem the two thinkers both try to address: getting beyond a philosophy of judgment and the restrictions of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By tracing the development of their attempts to address this problem, Somers-Hall offers an interpretation of the sweep of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy, providing a series of analyses of key moments in the history of thought, including the logics of Aristotle and Russell, Kant’s own philosophy of judgment, and the philosophy of Bergson. He also develops a novel interpretation of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, and situates his philosophy in relation to the broader post-Kantian tradition. In addition to Deleuze’s relation to Hegel, the book makes important contributions to the study of Deleuze’s philosophy of mathematics, as well as to the study of several underappreciated areas of Hegel’s own philosophy. “Neither simply disdainful of Hegel, nor wholly convinced by Deleuze, in this rich, wide-ranging volume, Henry Somers-Hall offers what is assuredly the most comprehensive and important treatment of their varied and complex relations to date … a rewarding and recommended read for anyone interested in the ongoing development of Continental philosophy.” — Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews “This is the most comprehensive and philosophically interesting analysis of the Deleuze-Hegel relation. Somers-Hall has assembled a remarkable amount of material that is quite diverse—from the problems of representation, judgment, and calculus to those of force and evolution—and his interpretations are masterful. This book will have a significant impact on the way we think about the development of twentieth-century philosophy.” — Leonard Lawlor, Sparks Professor of Philosophy, Penn State University “Somers-Hall’s book is a profound engagement with both Deleuze and Hegel, and it provides a much-needed antidote to interpretations that all-too-quickly characterize Deleuze as anti-Hegelian.” — Daniel W. Smith, coeditor of Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text Henry Somers-Hall is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom. He is the cotranslator (with Alistair Welchman, Mergen Reglitz, and Nick Midgley) of Salomon Maimon’s Essay on Transcendental Philosophy.
naturally dovetails into the dialectical movement itself, provided one does not, as Kant does, replace the final moment of reconciliation of the determinations with their suspension within subjective reason. In order to show the truly dialectical nature of the antinomies, Hegel begins by showing that both arguments exhibit the fallacy of petitio principii, by affirming in the premises what they hope to prove in the conclusion. The thesis, which argues that the world has a beginning in time,
empirical, a situation Deleuze also criticizes, or it simply inverts it, leading to an inevitable dialectical reconciliation of the two principles. Hegel therefore argues that transcendental philosophy is ultimately explanatorily empty. For Deleuze, however, this argument simply rests on the fact that difference has been reduced to a form of opposition for Hegel. If difference is not taken to the extreme of opposition, it provides the possibility of a transcendental explanation that is different
consider Sartre's fundamental axiom, that consciousness is always consciousness of x. The implication of this is that neither consciousness nor its correlate can exist independently of the other, paralleling the celebrated result of Kant himself. The attempt to do away with the transcendental ego while preserving consciousness is therefore doomed to failure. This result is fully recognized by Sartre, for whom this dynamic personalization of the transcendental field answers questions left open
necessary that for Aristotle, species and genera do not merely define general ‘heaps’ of things but group things together according to criteria that capture something common to their essence. It is for this reason that right at the opening of Aristotle's Organon, we have a discussion of three terms, homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy.9 Aristotle defines these various terms in the following ways: When things have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to that name is
infinite aggregate and that of infinite expansion, stays within the acknowledgement of itself; there is indeed a contradiction, but not the contradiction, that is, infinity itself. Both get as far as the requirement that the two alternating members [positing and surpassing the limit] be sublated, but the requirement is as far as they go” (JL, 33). We can see here that there are, therefore, two concepts of contradiction, just as there are two concepts of the infinite. The bad infinite and ‘bad