Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Oxford Philosophical Texts)
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In this classic text, Kant sets out to articulate and defend the Categorical Imperative - the fundamental principle that underlies moral reasoning - and to lay the foundation for a comprehensive account of justice and human virtues.
This new edition and translation of Kant's work is designed especially for students. An extensive and comprehensive introduction explains the central concepts of Groundwork and looks at Kant's main lines of argument. Detailed notes aim to clarify Kant's thoughts and to correct some common misunderstandings of his doctrines.
catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contributors J. B. Schneewind is professor of philosophy (emeritus) at Johns Hopkins University. Marcia Baron is professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. Shelly Kagan is Henry R. Luce Professor of Social Thought and Ethics at
universal law’’ (G 4:421; cf. G 4:402) with its variant FLN The Formula of the Law of Nature: ‘‘So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature’’ (G 4:421; cf. G 4:436) Second formula: FH The Formula of Humanity as End in Itself: ‘‘Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means’’ (G 4:429; cf. G 4:436) Third formula: FA Formula of Autonomy: ‘‘the
Stoicism and Epicureanism, see The Critique of Practical Reason (KpV 5:116) and Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (R 6:57–59). 8. It is ‘‘not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys) of others,’’ but ‘‘it is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate . . . feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to
ﬂow.’’ But in such cases, presumably, the principle implicit in one’s act is precisely one that endorses acting spontaneously in circumstances of this sort.) So when I act, I presuppose a rule or principle that claims that I have reason to do what I do (given the circumstances, and so forth). But which 118 Shelly Kagan rules should I act on? This much seems clear: I should only act on rules that are themselves valid. (The precise term of commendation used here isn’t important for our
this promotes the overall good, but there is, nonetheless, a constraint against bodily harm to the innocent, even when this is necessary to bring about the best results overall. If something like this were the case, then, of course, it would still be true that FUL supports deontology. So long as there is any constraint at all—any prohibition against performing an act with good results overall—FUL supports deontology rather than consequentialism. In short, focusing on maxims concerned with lying