Great Powers and Regional Orders (Us Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World)
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Explores the manifestations of US power in the Persian Gulf and the limits of American influence. Significantly this volume offers an exploration of both US domestic politics as it impacts policy toward the region, as well as the role played by that region on regional order and stability. Well organized and logically structured, this volume offers a new and unique contribution to the field applicable not only to US policy in the Persian Gulf but may also be applied to other regional contexts.
geographically concentrated in the three northernmost provinces of Iraq, the country’s Sunni and Shi’a populations are signi¿ cantly more integrated.12 In addition, there are an unknowable but potentially signi¿ cant number of secular Iraqis for whom sectarian af¿ liation is not a relevant source of identity. Those who stress the degree of unity among Iraq’s Arab population and downplay the signi¿ cance of the Sunni/Shi’a division can also point to the relative absence of sectarian strife during
Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation,” European Journal of International Relations, 10/1 (2004), pp. 95-136; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “International Governance as New Raison d’État? The Case of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy,” ibid . , 10/2 (2004), pp. 147-88. 65 Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration (19 June 1002), available at http://www.weu.int/documents/920619naen.pdf, Chapter II, art. 5. 66 All the relevant documents are contained
neo-conservative school, dubbed “Wilsonians of the right” by some, who not only regarded him as a threat to the region and to U.S interests, but who had long desired to move Iraq in a more democratic direction.21 A number of them had advocated this position for years, going back to 1991. InÀ uenced by exile Iraqi opposition leaders such as Ahmad Chalabi, they came to believe that the bulk of the population would actively support U.S. “liberation” and that the task would be relatively easy.
Mississippi. Although the Reserve was established to cushion oil markets during energy disruptions, non-emergency sales of oil from the Reserve were authorized by the Congress to raise revenues and reduce the federal budget de¿ cit, as well as to dampen price hikes.4 In other words, since its inception, the SPR has been used by policymakers both, as a tool of crisis management and as an instrument to counter 3 Department of Energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve – Pro¿ le, December 2005. 4
conservative and pro-Western policy in the region. There was no place in the world during the ¿ rst half of the 1970s where the Nixon Doctrine was more evident than in the Gulf. Both pillars enjoyed Washington’s permanent political, economic, and diplomatic attention. Of course, differences between the pillars did not vanish. King Faisal knew only too well that Imperial Iran was superior to him in almost all matters of importance.5 He was more than once frustrated by the Shah’s posture as