Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
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What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History.
political =⇒ =⇒ =⇒ powert institutionst institutionst+1 powert+1 Groups that have political power today can introduce – or force others to introduce – political institutions that favor them. These political institutions persist and regulate the allocation of political power in the future. Therefore, democratization enables the citizens to increase their political power in the future. 20:49 P1: JtR 0521855268c06.tex CB919-Acemoglu.cls 0 521 85526 8 The Role of Political Institutions
economics course. The main prerequisite for following the entire content of the book is a knowledge of basic ideas from complete information game theory at the level of Gibbons (1992). Nevertheless, we have designed the ﬁrst two chapters to be a generally comprehensible and nonmathematical exposition of the questions we address and the answers we propose. In writing this book, we incurred many debts. During the eight-year period that we worked on these topics, we gave many seminars on our
it more intuitive to rule out this case, which is not relevant for the models we study in this book. 4:38 P1: OYK 0521855268c04.tex 94 CB919-Acemoglu.cls 0 521 85526 8 September 10, 2005 Democratic Politics A large political science and political economy literature focuses on such singlepeaked preferences. This is because single-peaked preferences generate the famous and powerful MVT, which constitutes a simple way of determining equilibrium policies from the set of individual
the customers. If whether the payment will be made is decided by the trader, not the customer, the problem will be solved. One way of doing so in the previous economic example is for the customer to give a postdated check to the trader, who will then cash it on the speciﬁed date. It is clearly in the interest of the trader to cash the check because the costs are borne by the customer, and she is the beneﬁciary herself. In other words, the commitment problem has been solved by removing the
of indirect universal male suffrage. The peasants, the townsmen, and the gentry all elected their own representatives. Delegates from all provinces met in the provincial town and chose members of the Duma. However, since publication of the October Manifesto, Nicholas II had 5:59 P1: KsF 0521855268c05.tex 142 CB919-Acemoglu.cls 0 521 85526 8 September 10, 2005 Nondemocratic Politics already made several changes in the composition of the Duma: he had created a state council, an upper