After Victory: Order and Power in International Politics
G. John Ikenberry
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Publish Year note: First published in 2000
The end of the Cold War was a "big bang" reminiscent of earlier moments after major wars, such as the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and the end of the World Wars in 1919 and 1945. Here John Ikenberry asks the question, what do states that win wars do with their newfound power and how do they use it to build order? In examining the postwar settlements in modern history, he argues that powerful countries do seek to build stable and cooperative relations, but the type of order that emerges hinges on their ability to make commitments and restrain power.
The author explains that only with the spread of democracy in the twentieth century and the innovative use of international institutions--both linked to the emergence of the United States as a world power--has order been created that goes beyond balance of power politics to exhibit "constitutional" characteristics. The open character of the American polity and a web of multilateral institutions allow the United States to exercise strategic restraint and establish stable relations among the industrial democracies despite rapid shifts and extreme disparities in power.
Blending comparative politics with international relations, and history with theory, After Victory will be of interest to anyone concerned with the organization of world order, the role of institutions in world politics, and the lessons of past postwar settlements for today. It also speaks to today's debate over the ability of the United States to lead in an era of unipolar power.
Cold War were the shrinkage in the amount of the world that would be organized according to this logic and the types of institutional strategies that were pursued in order to secure such an order. Second, America’s broad postwar goals predated the rise of the Cold War and drew upon a wide array of complementary ideas about political, economic, and security order. State Department officials who advanced notions of an open world economy were reinforced by defense planners who linked American
German situation; to the acknowledgement of their responsibility for integrating western Germany into western Europe, and to a detailed agreement with us as to how this shall be done. To this effort we must expect to give, as well as to receive, concessions.” “Resume of World Situation,” 6 November 1997, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 774–75. 98 “Memorandum of Conversation by the British Foreign Office,” undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 3, pp.
95–97, 101, 104, 111 Quintuple Alliance (1818), 101 Reagan, Ronald, 220, 221 realist theory, 10–11, 26n.l4 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (1934), 177 Reeves, Emery, 176 religious divisions, 33–34 Reservation to League of Nations (U.S. Senate), 152–54 retraint strategies. See power constraint strategies Rice, Cecil Spring, 141 Riddell, George, 123 Riker, William H., 59, 60 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 173–75, 190, 213, 260 Roosevelt, Theodore, 149, 150 “rules of the game.” See
mechanisms and procedures of consultation and participation can be created in the process of bonding. The leading state can go beyond simply opening itself up to weaker and secondary states by engaging in institutional binding; it can establish institutional links with other states, thereby limiting its own autonomy and allowing other states to have institutionalized “voice opportunities” in the decision making of the leading state. In effect, binding institutions create constraints on the way
my dominant thought in going to the conference is that nothing must occur which shall separate in the post-war period the four powers which have come together in the war. For this entente, I shall make every sacrifice.49 Although Clemenceau was single-minded about weakening the German state and creating a balance of power to counter German aggression, he remained open to various strategies of doing so.50 In an important signal of the possible ways in which the French government might pursue its